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     1 
Abstract 
This paper evaluates land preservation and conservation programs by examining the performance 
of a discriminative auction that is often used to select parcels in the U.S.  The paper hypothesizes 
that the auction is unlikely to be cost effective because an information asymmetry introduces 
adverse selection.  Experiments are used to examine the extent of adverse selection and compare 
it to a baseline where no programs exist.  Then, we examine the ability of two mechanisms to 
correct the incentive problem.  The results show that adverse selection is likely to exist in 
conservation auctions (achieving just 60.7% of total possible social efficiency in the 
experiments) and that a mechanism can sort types so as to improve cost effectiveness with 
respect to the specific information asymmetry (90-92% of total social surplus).  However, the 
mechanisms involve large transfers and the experiments show that a simple externality-
correcting tax can achieve more cost effectiveness (99.4% of social efficiency) with lower 
transfers.  This is an important result for policy because recent trends are focused on expanding 
fiscally costly auctions rather than taxes.  The result also is surprising and important for 
researchers because there is little intuition as to why the tax resolves the selection problem.   2 
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  Owners of agricultural and natural lands make production decisions with implications 
beyond the nominal boundary of the pricing system.  Erosion, nutrient loading, and groundwater 
depletion are representative of cost-shifting behavior, while benefit-conferring behavior arises 
from the provision of carbon sequestration and amenities such as scenic, open-space, and habitat.  
Over the past thirty years, institutions proliferated to offer these landowners incentives to abate 
cost shifting and to perpetuate benefit provision.  For instance, the most recent U.S. Farm Bill 
(2008-2012) allocates $11.7 billion for conservation, while the E.U. plans to spend €35.4 billion 
between 2007 and 2013 on its ―agri-environmental‖ programs.
1 In 2010 alone, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture plans to spend $1.8 billion on rental payments under the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) (USDA 2009).  Beyond these expenditures, the U.S. federal government 
spends on average approximately $1 billion per year protecting endangered species (Langpap 
and Kerkvliet 2010), U.S. states and counties spent over $2 billion protection over 1 million 
acres with permanent agricultural conservation easements in 25 years (American Farmland Trust 
2010), and 1,667 private U.S. land trusts protected 37 million acres through 2005 (Aldrich and 
Wyerman 2006).  Governments outside the U.S. and E.U., governments also pursue 
conservation.  Despite these large expenditures, conservation may be even more fiscally 
important in the future as policies are developed to pay farmers and natural landowners for 
carbon sequestration activities. 
  These programs transfer large quantities of tax dollars to landowners, and thus it is 
reasonable to ask: How well do these programs perform?  We are particularly interested in the 
cost effectiveness of the auctions used to select parcels.  The basic economics is simple.  
Institutions either create new conservation markets or alter prices within existing land markets to 
promote conservation ends.  We know the inchoate efficiency arguments supporting such 
interventions: (1) they internalize externalities; (2) they bring the environment into the market 
                                                           
1 U.S. calculations based on data from Claassen R., Conservation Policy Briefing Room, Economic Research 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. <http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/conservationpolicy/background.htm> 
accessed Feb. 2010. E.U. calculations based on data for Axis 2, Section 214, of the second pillar of the Common 
Agricultural Policy from:  European Union Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, “Rural 
Development in the European Union: Statistical and Economic Information Report 2009.” (EU, Brussels, 2009).   3 
economy; and (3) auctions are used to select successful sellers because of funding constraints.  
Unfortunately, little evidence exists on whether these programs are efficient or whether they 
achieve social goals at the least cost.  Previous work has identified a lack of coordination 
between the incentive created and the market failure (Duke and Lynch 2006), so it is unlikely 
that externalities are internalized correctly.  The research presented here will show that these 
markets are unlikely to be cost effective because of incentive problems arising from information 
asymmetry. 
This paper draws on the intuition in Akerlof (1970) to argue that conservation auctions 
are plagued by adverse selection and, in consequence, are not altering land-use patterns very 
much despite spending billions of dollars per year.  In other words, these policies are transferring 
tens of billions of dollars from the government and nonprofits to landowners who were the most 
likely to deliver the conservation services in the absence of a policy.  Among the drivers of this 
problem are the auction mechanisms used: (1) discriminative auctions that allow landowners to 
―name their price‖ and institutional constraints that force program managers to select the 
―cheapest‖; and (2) the relatively small program budgets, which ensure that only a small subset 
of potential sellers will be selected.  Although this story is straightforward, it has made little 
impact on the economic literature and there is no evidence we can find of an appreciable 
recognition of adverse selection in policy. 
Wu and Babcock (1996) and Smith (1995) offered conceptual treatments of adverse 
selection in the conservation setting, comparing the status quo to second-best contracts offered 
by mechanism design.  In the former papers, landowning sellers‘ private information about their 
reservation value drove the incentive problem, and Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) have 
offered empirical measures of these heterogeneous values using CRP auction data.  Conservation 
auctions are often viewed as superior to fixed conservation payments because they ―solve‖ some 
information problems—by paying heterogeneous owners by their individual offers—and as a 
way to conserve scarce government resources—by forcing owners to compete for limited budget 
expenditures.  Auctions are used in many real-world settings, including the CRP, and some 
evidence suggests they outperform fixed price approaches (Horowitz, Lynch, and Stocking 2009)  
by supplying more acres of conservation.  
   4 
Two key experimental studies exist.  In Cason and Gangadharan (2004) the conservation 
buyer is posited to hold an information advantage—i.e., landowners do not know the 
environmental benefits of their land—and the lab results show that a discriminative auction 
outperforms a uniform-price auction.  Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) use experiments to 
compare auctions to fixed price conservation, finding that the advantages of auctions erode as the 
conservation buyer and sellers interact over time. 
In this paper, a model of conservation auctions is developed to describe the adverse 
selection phenomenon.  The predicted adverse selection will then be replicated in the lab, and the 
efficiency of several different institutions will be compared to the status quo (discriminative 
auction, a price instrument, and a suite of screening contracts).  We believe this is the first 
experimental examination of adverse selection in conservation auctions and is the first to 
compare the performance of discriminative auctions to a price instrument and to second-best 
contracts.  The experimental results show that adverse selection can be replicated in the lab, 
suggesting it is indeed a problem in real-world discriminative auction settings.  The results also 
show that the second-best contract outperform the discriminative auction under a full range of 
assumptions about the deadweight loss of government expenditures.  Furthermore, the price 
instrument is found to outperform contracts. 
1  The Model 
  Consider a market in which  N  individuals own land that is currently undeveloped and 
provides a positive social externality S  in its undeveloped state.  For structure, we focus on the 
case of a program to purchase permanent conservation easements, though the model should adapt 
to other conservation auctions.  Each parcel has a private development value  D i   in a 
competitive commercial real estate market where D is a common development parameter, and 
i   is a site specific development parameter.  The value of  i   is private information to the owner 
and can be ascertained by a developer prior to purchase, but is not easily observed by the 
government.  The value  D i   represents the price the owner can obtain by selling the parcel to a 
developer.  In its undeveloped state the property provides the current owner a positive land return 
f  which is common to all parcels, as well as a private utility with a dollar value of  i zv  where   5 
z  is a utility parameter common to all owners and  i v  is an owner specific utility parameter. We 
assume that it is possible for the government to change the owner's private utility through 
changes in  z  which impose the same cost on the government regardless of the parcel, but which 
will have different marginal effects on the landowner's private utility value depending upon  . i v  
In particular, because 

d
2 zvi/dvidz=1/ 4 zvi  >0 and  0, < /
2 3 dz dv zv d i i  the impact of a 
change in  z  on marginal utility is greater for a landowner with a higher private value  i v  but is 
decreasing in  . z   Each parcel is characterized by a parameter pair  . , i i v    The government 
knows the set of   i i v ,   pairs, but is unable to determine the particular parcel to which a specific 
  i i v ,   pair is assigned -- each landowner‘s   i i v ,   is private information. 
In the absence of any program to purchase development rights, a landowner will retain 
the property in its undeveloped state if  D zv f i i     and will sell to a developer if 







=   (1) 
defines a boundary such that in the absence of any program to purchase development rights in 
order to preserve undeveloped land, any property characterized by a   i i v ,   that lies above this 
boundary will be sold to a developer, and any parcel below the boundary will be preserved. It is 
clear that a market with no preservation program is not optimal because of the social externality 
. S  In particular, it is socially optimal for a parcel to be preserved if  D S f zv i i      and to 







=   (2) 
such that it is socially optimal for any parcel characterized by a pair  } , { i i v   that lies above this 
boundary to be developed and for any parcel that lies below this boundary to be preserved.  
These boundary conditions, presented in Figure 1, can be used to classify each parcel into one of   6 
three categories. We define type 1 parcels (or land owners) as those satisfying  , < i i    type 2 
parcels as those satisfying  , i i i       and type 3 parcels as those satisfying  . > i i    It is 
socially optimal for type 1 and type 2 parcels to be preserved and for type 3 parcels to be 
developed.  However, in the absence of a preservation program, the socially optimal outcome 
will only occur for type 1 and type 3 parcels.  The type 2 parcels, for which 
, > > f zv D f S i i     will be sold to a developer despite the fact that preservation of these 
parcels is socially optimal.  These parcels are a primary target of land preservation programs 
which purchase development rights from landowners. 
1.1  Allocation using an auction mechanism with a budget constraint  
In this subsection we consider the use of an auction mechanism to purchase development 
rights from landowners when the state has a limited budget for the program.  Under the auction 
mechanism the government announces the amount  E  allocated to the auction and invites the  N  
landowners to participate.  Each participant submits a bid  i b  that he is willing to accept in return 
for transferring development rights to his land to the state.  If the bid is accepted, then the state 
gains control of the development rights.  If it is not accepted, then the owner retains his private 
value.  Assume that in the absence of an auction program there are  1 n  type 1 parcels,  2 n  type 2 
parcels, and  2 1 3 = n n N n    type 3 parcels.
2 
For any expenditure E  announced by the government, any landowner for whom the price 
D i   offered by a developer is less than the price that the state pays in the auction will prefer to 
sell development rights to the state.  This is true regardless of whether or not the owner is willing 
to sell to a developer.  Owners for whom  i i zv f D     (the type 1 owners) are willing to sell 
to the state at any price.  Owners for whom  i i zv f D  >   (those above the boundary defined 
by equation (2) will only sell to the state instead of a developer at a bid  i b  such that 
                                                           
2If we suppose that v is distributed over some interval   v 0,  and that   is distributed over some interval    ,  












f S zv  /D  g v,  ddvn1, and  . = 2 1 3 n n N n      7 
   i i zv f b   D i   or  . i i i zv f D b     Define  i b  as the lowest bid that would induce 
owner i to sell development rights to the state. Note that if  , < i i zv f D    so the price offered 
by the developer is less than the owners utility from preserving the parcel, then the owner is 
willing to transfer rights to the state at any bid greater than 0. Thus, 

bi =max 0,iD f  zvi   . 
Note that in equilibrium all winning bidders must submit the same equilibrium bid  ,
~
b  
and this bid must satisfy  E n b w =
~ , where  w n  is the number of winning bidders.  The claim that 
all successful bidders must submit the same bid b
~
 follows from the fact that if two owners with 
bids  i b  and  , j b  where  , > j i b b  are both successful in the auction, then bidder  j  could have 
submitted a higher bid and still been successful, so  j b  was not an equilibrium bid.  The claim 
that  E n b w =
~  follows from the fact that if  , <
~
E n b w  then any one of the winning bidders would 
still have won with a bid of    b
~
 for some small  0. >   In addition, the type 1 owners all will 
be successful bidders in any equilibrium. Because the type 1 owners are willing to sell 
development rights to the state at any equilibrium bid  0, > b  they will always submit the 
equilibrium bid  .
~
b  
Given  the  known  owner  ty pes,  we  can  order  the  bidders  according  to  the  minimum 
amount  i b  each would accept in in the auction where  0 = i b  for the  1 n  type 1 bidders.  Ordering 
owners from the lowest to highest minimum acceptable bids, we have  
  . < < = = = = 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 N n n n n n n n b b b b b b b b               
Proposition 1   
    1.  If 

E < n11  bn11, then the equilibrium bid  , / =
~
1 n E b  and only the  1 n  type 1 
owners who would not have developed their parcel in the absence of a program will sell their 
development rights to the state.   8 
    2.  If 

n11  bn11  E < n11k  bn11k, where k  is an integer satisfying  1, 2  k n  
then    k n E b  1 / =
~
 and the first k  of the type 2 bidders as well as all of the  1 n  type 1 bidders 
sell their development rights to the state. 
 
    3.  If 

n1n2 1  bn1n21  E < n1n2 1k  bn1n21k, where k  is an integer 
satisfying  1, 3  k n  then    k n n E b   2 1 / =
~
 and the first k  of the type 3 owners and all of the 
type 1 and type 2 owners sell their development rights to the state. 
    4.  If  , N b N E  then the equilibrium bid is  , / =
~
N E b  and all owners sell development 
rights to the state.  
  
Proposition 1 illustrates the adverse selection problem inherent in the use of an auction to 
purchase development rights.  In any auction equilibrium, the  1 n  owners who would not develop 
their property in the absence of an auction are always included in the set of successful bidders.  
These owners drive up the minimum expenditure required by the government to preserve 
properties that would not be preserved in the absence of a government program.  Furthermore, 
any increase in the budget amount  E  will increase the winning bid received by these owners -- 
the increase in  E  will not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of parcels preserved.  An 
example of this is provided in the discussion of the experimental design in section 2 below. 
1.2  Screening Mechanism 
In this section we consider the use of a screening mechanism as a means of improving 
upon the auction mechanism in the government effort to preserve undeveloped land.  It is well 
known that screening mechanisms are ideally suited for addressing adverse selection problems 
(see Riley (2001) for a survey of the literature).  We consider screening contracts of the form 
  t p,  where  R  p  is a direct payment to the owner (or payment from the owner to the state if 
0), < p  and 

t z,) is an adjustment to  z  which impacts the owners preservation value.  In   9 
particular, if an owner agrees to transfer development rights to the state in return for a contract 
 , ,t p  then the owner's utility is 

ui = f  p z t  vi. 
It is helpful to compare our setting with a standard screening model in which an employer 
is interested in sorting workers by ability level in a way that excludes the lowest skilled workers, 
and then pays all higher skilled workers a wage that is increasing in the workers skill level, and 
avoids outcomes in which lower skilled workers opt for a contract intended for higher skilled 
workers.  The standard assumption that the marginal cost of education is decreasing in the 
worker's innate ability level generates a single crossing property which ensures that observable 
education levels serve to screen workers by ability level.  An important feature of these models is 
the fact that the firm wishes to include all workers whose skill level exceeds some minimum.  In 
our model, the owner's private preservation parameter  i v  is analogous to the negative of skill 
level in the classic job market screening context, and changes to the parameter  z  by an amount t 
are analogous to the negative of education. As noted earlier, we also assume that the state can 
impact the owner's private preservation value by altering the parameter  . z  Because reductions in 
z  are more costly and increases in  z  are more beneficial to an owner owners with a higher  , i v  
the individual utility functions satisfy a single crossing property so that contracts offering   t p,  
pairs can be used to screen different owners. The complication in our land allocation setting 
when compared with the standard job market screening model is that the state wishes to exclude 
owners with very low reservation values (low  i v  and  ) i  as well as those with very high 
reservation values Thus, for two owners with identical preservation values,  , i v  (analogously, 
identical skill levels), it is possible that it is optimal for the state to include one and exclude the 
other from participation in the program. 
For a given owner i  the reservation utility level from not accepting a contract offered by 
the state is  
    . , m ax = D zv f U i i     (3) 
Ideally, the contracts would offer both the type 1 and type 3 owners a utility less than  U  while 
attracting  type  2  o wners  to  preserve  their  property  instead  of  selling  to  a  developer.  Let  B    10 
denote the set of owners who choose to sell to a developer, let  C  denote the set of owners who 
accept one of the contracts in return for transferring development rights to the state, and let R  
denote the set of owners who refuse both the developer's offer and the state contract. The state's 
objective  is  to  choose  a  set  of m  different  contracts 

p,t  = p1,t1   ,K , pm,tm       which 
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i  zt j









 f S zvi   , 
subject to  
 

iB if iD > max f  p j
i  zt j





iC if f  p j
i  zt j
i   vi max iD, f  zvi  
iR if f  zvi > max iD, f  p j
i  zt j



















i   . It is 
clear that a screening mechanism at least weakly dominates an auction because the government 
can always adopt the contract set 

p,t  = ǜ  b  ,0      which simply offers to purchase development 
rights from any landowner willing to sell to the state at the equilibrium bid b
~
 for the auction. 
Such contracts would result in the same outcome achieved by the auction. Thus we have 
 
Proposition 2 The use of screening contracts dominates the use of an auction as a 
mechanism for purchasing development rights in order to preserve undeveloped parcels.  
 
While it is easy to see that screening contracts at least weakly dominate the auction, it is 
not obvious that they strictly dominate the auction.  However, by using differences in each   11 
owner's private land preferences  i zv  the government may be able to improve upon the auction 
mechanism with contracts that separate different land owners.  The fact that the marginal benefit 
of the contract parameter t  is increasing in the owner's private preservation value  i v  implies that 
for a given  , i   a single crossing property holds for owners with different  i v  values. An owner's 
indifference curve from accepting a contract is defined by the set of contracts   t p ˆ , ˆ  satisfying 

f  ǆ  p  zǆ  t   vi =K where K  is an arbitrary constant. Restating the indifference curve in 
  t p,  space, we have  
 

ǆ  p =K  f  zǆ  t    vi. 
Thus, the slope of an indifference curve is increasing in  . i v   This implies that for a given  , i   
standard results in the screening literature apply, and owners can be sorted by contracts. 
However, the screening contracts are still subject to an adverse selection problem because it is 
possible that owners with the same  i v  parameter will have different development parameters  . i    
The adverse selection problem arises because type 1 owners, who have lower  i   values than 
type 2 owners with the same  i v  parameter, participate in the program even though no program is 
needed to induce them to preserve their property.  This presents a problem for screening 
contracts because any contract preferred over selling to a developer by a type 2 owner with a 
given  i v  also will be preferred over not participating in the program by a type 1 owner with the 
same  . i v   Thus, the screening contracts cannot be used to exclude type 1 owners from 
participating.  However, because owner preferences satisfy the single crossing property with 
respect to  , t  screening contracts can be used to separate owners with different  i v  parameters. 
Incentive compatibility constraints require that type 1 owners do not participate, type 2 
owners participate, and type 3 owners sell to a developer.  Using the boundaries derived in the 
previous subsection these constraints can be stated as    12 
 

f  zvi > f  p j
i
 zt j




i   vi >iD if f S zvi >iD > f  zvi
iD > f  p j
i
 zt j
i   vi if iD > f S zvi.
 
In general contracts satisfying these constraints for at least some owners can be established, 
generating an outcome that is less subject to adverse selection than the auction. 
 
1.3  A Simple Taxation Mechanism 
The adverse selection problem associated with mechanisms through which development 
rights are purchased arises because they shift the lower boundary defined by equation 

  
upwards and are therefore attractive to both type 1 and type 2 owners.  As an alternative to 
purchasing development rights, a policy which reduces the sellers return  D i   to  D i  ~  such that  
  and , if ~
i i i i zv S f D zv f D         
  . > if > ~
i i i i zv S f D zv f D       
also would ensure efficient allocation of each parcel.  These equations imply that 
  and , if ~
i i i i zv f S D zv f D         
  . > if > ~
i i i i zv f S D zv f D       
This is satisfied by any policy such that  S D D i i    = ~  or  . / = ~ D S i i     Because this policy is 
independent of the owner's private preservation value  , i v  any policy which reduces the private 
development value  i   of the owner by the amount  D S/  will result in the efficient development 
and preservation outcomes for all parcels.   13 
A simple tax can be implemented to achieve this result. In particular, let  i t  be the tax rate 
imposed on the sale price if owner i's parcel is sold to a developer. The owner's return from sale 
is   . 1 i i t D    Setting the tax rate so that this return equals the sellers return  D i  ~  achieved under 
the optimal policy yields 
    D t D i i i   ~ = 1  
    . / = D D S i    
Solving for the optimal tax policy yields  . / = D S t i i 
  Noting that  D i   is the price the developer 
is willing to pay for the parcel, it follows that the optimal total tax  D t i i
  for any parcel i  is  . S  
A flat tax of S  imposed on the sale of any parcel to a developer results in only those parcels for 
which the value of the parcel in development exceeds the total social value from preservation 
being sold to a developer.  Such a flat tax will successfully screen owners by causing each owner 
to fully internalize the social cost of selling to a developer. Of course, this is just the well-known 
Pigouvian tax. 
In the market for development rights, government programs which pay landowners to 
preserve their land, effectively assigning the social surplus to the owner and paying the owner for 
providing that surplus to society are subject to an adverse selection problem in which the state 
pays some landowners for services that would have been provided even in the absence of the 
government program.  With a fixed government budget allocated to make payments to owners 
for this surplus, the resulting outcome is not economically efficient.  The inefficiency is greatest 
under the auction mechanism, and can be mitigated, but not eliminated using screening contracts.  
However, if rights to the social surplus are assigned to the state, and owners (or developers) are 
penalized for destruction of social surplus, then the socially efficient outcome can be achieved 
through a tax in the amount of the social surplus destroyed.
3 
                                                           
3Note that if the government faces no budget constraint, then the assignment of rights to the social surplus is 
irrelevant á la Coase. The auction with a budget of   S n n E 2 1 =   results in an equilibrium bid of  S b =
~
. Under   14 
 
2  Experimental Design 
2.1  Experiment Parameters 
To test the predictions of the theoretical models, we conduct economic experiments using 
parameters that reflect possible land, development and private preservation values with twelve 
landowners distributed symmetrically over  ) , ( v   space.  We use three different development 
values,   , .25,.5,.75  i   and four different private preservation values   , 0,1,2,3  i v  which 
results in twelve different owner types presented in Table 1.  
 We assign a land use value of  $3000 = f  and a development value of  $20,000 = D  to 
all properties.  This implies that in our experiment, the developer will make an offer of $5000 to 
owners 1-4, of $10,000 to owners 5-7, and of $15,000 to owners 9-12.  The social surplus of 
each parcel is set at  $10,000, = S  and the parameter  400,000. = z   This implies that owner land 
preservation utility values,  i zv  range from 0  to $3464, with an average of $2073, and that an 
owner's overall utility  i i zv f U  =  from his parcel ranges from 3000 to 6464.  
Below one may see the socially optimal allocation of each parcel as well as the expected 
allocation in the absence of any program to purchase development rights.  The outcome is 
denoted  P  if the property is preserved and  D if the property is developed.  
 
Parcel Allocation  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
No Program  D  P  P  P  D  D  P  P  D  D  D  D 
 Socially Optimal   P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  D  P  P  P 
  
The typical development value for an acre of agricultural land varies widely depending 
upon property characteristics.  However, the average capitalized value is in the $7,000 range.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
such a program, any owner for whom  D zv S f i i      will sell development rights to the government while 
those for whom  i i zv S f D   >   will sell to a developer. This is the socially optimal allocation.   15 
The typical capitalized revenue from agricultural use is $3,000.  In the experiment we consider a 
market in which the parameters of each of the twelve owners are known, but the mechanism 
designer is unable to observe the parameters of any specific landowner. The preference and 
development parameters are held constant across all rounds. 
2.2  The Auction Mechanism 
Under the auction mechanism, each owner must choose between one of three alternatives. 
They can keep their property, which yields a utility of  , = i i zv f U   sell to a developer at a 
price of  , D i   or submit a bid  i b  in the auction which yields a utility of  i i i zv b f U   =  if the 
bid is accepted, and a utility of  i i zv f U  =  if the bid is rejected.  As demonstrated in Section 
1.1, the equilibrium bid and successful biders are determined by the budget  . E   To select this 
budget, we determined the dollar amount that would generate the largest marginal contribution to 
total welfare.  In order for the auction to preserve land that would otherwise be developed, a 
budget of at least  4050 = E  is needed.  This is obtained by subtracting the utility  i zv f   
obtained by not developing parcel i  from the development offer  D i   to determine the minimum 
bid each owner would be willing to accept in return for transferring development rights to the 
state.  This value is negative for owners 2-4, 7 and 8 (five of the twelve owners).  The surplus 
generated by inducing a type 2 (or 3) owner to sell development rights to the state instead of a 
developer is equal to the difference between the surplus  i zv S f    generated by preserving 
the land and the development value  . D i    The surplus gained from participation by a type 1 
owner is 0.  The minimum bid and auction surplus values are presented below.  Owner types are 
ordered by minimum bid.  
Subject   2    3    4    7    8    6    12    1    11    10    5    9  
i b    0    0    0    0    0    675    1046    2000    3056    5675    7000    12000  
Auction 
Surplus  
 -    -    -    -    0    9325    8954    8000    6944    4325    3000    -2000  
 
 Using the analysis from Section 1.1 we can determine the expenditure  E  needed to 
include each owner as a successful bidder in the equilibrium of the auction.  A minimal 
expenditure is needed to induce owners 2-4 and 6-7 to participate because they are willing to sell   16 
development rights to the state at any bid greater than 0.  To induce the next owner (of parcel 6) 
to participate, a minimum bid of $675 must be paid to six bidders (owners 2-4, 7, 8 and 6) which 
implies a total expenditure of  $4050. = E   Including the next owner (of parcel 12) requires an 
expenditure of  $7322. = $1046 7 =  E   An increase in the expenditure of $3272 generates an 
additional surplus of $8954. Including the next owner (of parcel 1) requires an expenditure of 
$16,000, = $2000 8 =  E  or an increase of  $8678 = $7322 $16,000   and generates an increase 
in surplus of $8000.  Adding owner 1 to the set of successful bidders in equilibrium requires an 
increase in the auction expenditure which exceeds the benefit.  Therefore, in our experiment, we 
limit our auction budget to an amount such that only seven owners (2-4, 6-8, and 12) are 
successful bidders in the predicted equilibrium.  For reasons discussed above, we set an auction 
budget of $8535 in the experiment. 
2.3  The Screening Mechanism 
The screening mechanism allows for separating owners using contracts that take 
advantage of differences in each owner's marginal rate of substitution between a fixed payment 
i p  and a change  i t  to the property that enhances or reduces the private preservation utility 
parameter  . z   The inability to separate owners with the same  i v  discussed in Section 1.2 prevents 
the complete separation of owners using screening contracts.  In the screening treatment of our 
experiment we offer the subjects a choice between three contracts.  The first contract 

C1 = 2050,300000   offers a fixed payment of 2050 to any owner who is willing to accept a 
reduction in  z  of 30.  The reduction in  z  can be interpreted as allowing public access to the 
owners land which significantly reduces the private preservation utility for subjects 5-12 (those 
with  0), > i v  but has not impact on the utility of subjects 1-4 who place no value of preservation 
of the land.  We assume the cost    $2050; = 300000 2050,  c  requiring the owner to allow public 
access imposes no incremental cost on the state.  The second contract    700,0 = 2 C  offers a 
payment of $700 with no change in the owner's private preservation value. The cost 
  $700. = 700,0 c   Finally, under the third contract 

C3 = 2000,260000   the government 
significantly improves the owner's private preservation value in return for a payment of $2000 
from the owner. Because the third contract entails increasing the owner's total utility through the   17 
private utility parameter 

z t j   vi, the cost of this contract is not a straightforward fixed 
payment.  We (somewhat arbitrarily) assume that the cost of this contract is equal to 1.1 times 
the change in total utility achieved by this contract for a subject with  300. = i v  The  300 = i v  
subjects all should prefer this contract over selling to a developer or not participating in the 
program. The implies a cost of 

c 2000,260000  =1.12000 400000260000   300 400000  300  =$1228.5.   The 
predicted choices of each subject and the associated cost to the government are presented below 
(i.e., a summary of screening contracts).   i C  implies the subject chooses contract  i C ,  1,2,3, = i  
and D implies the subject sells to a developer.  
 
  Screening 
Allocation  
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12  
 Outcome     1 C      2 C      2 C      3 C    D     2 C      2 C      3 C    D   D   D     3 C   
Government 
Cost  
2050   700   700   1228.5    0   700   700   1228.5    0    0    0   1228.5  
 
The total expected cost of the screening mechanism to the government is $8535.50.  
Under these contracts the theory predicts that eight of the 12 parcels will be preserved, whereas 
only 7 of the 12 parcels are preserved under the auction mechanism.  The equilibrium with 7 of 
the 12 parcels being preserved with the auction mechanism also could have been achieved with a 
lower budget, of $7322.  Thus, the predicted outcome under the screening mechanism provides 
an increase in surplus of $8000 (the surplus from preserving instead of developing parcel 1) at an 
additional cost of $1213.5.  Because the minimum expenditure required to preserve the seven 
parcels that generate an increase in surplus which exceeds the increase in the auction budget 
required to secure that surplus is less than $8535.5, we set the auction budget equal to the 
expected cost of the screening mechanism, $8535.5, in order to increase the chance that 
additional parcels will be preserved under the auction if subjects do not adopt equilibrium   18 
strategies.  Because we expect that the screening mechanism will perform better than the auction, 
this choice of auction budget biases the experiment against our predicted outcome. 
2.3  The Tax Mechanism 
Under the tax mechanism, a tax of  $10,000 = =S   is imposed on any subject that sells 
to a developer.  This results in a final utility of  $10,000  D i   if the owner sells to a developer. 
Owners who do not sell to a developer receive the preservation utility  . = i i zv f u    The 
predicted outcome from this policy is that subject 9 sells to a developer and all other subjects 
retain their land. 
3  Experimental Design 
  A summary of the behavior and other parameters for the 12 types in the five treatments 
(described below) are presented in table 1.  A total of 120 subjects were recruited from 
undergraduate economics and business classes to participate in this experiment.  All of the 
sessions were conducted in an experimental economics laboratory in a large university in the 
northeast of the United States.  Subjects were assigned to a computer station by random.  Each 
computer station was equipped with privacy screens to ensure confidentiality of subject decisions 
and outcomes.  The choices were made using Excel spreadsheets programmed with Visual Basic 
for Applications.  Each experimental session lasted approximately one hour and a half and 
subjects earned approximately $20. 
  At the start of each session, subjects received written instructions (see Appendix) and 
listened to an oral description of the experiment protocols that was accompanied by a 
PowerPoint presentation.  Subjects were welcome to ask questions of the administrators, but 
were told not to talk with other participants of the experiment. 
  Each experiment session consisted of twelve subjects.  As discussed previously, in each 
round, there were 12 different sets of induced values (or seller) types.  Each treatment had 12 
rounds, which meant that each subject participated in each treatment as each seller type.  To 
control for potential order effects, the seller type in each round was randomly selected so that 
subjects did not know which type they would be in the subsequent rounds, nor were there any 
duplicates of types.  Additionally, the five treatments were presented in a Latin squares design to   19 
control for potential order effects.  The experiment consisted of 65 rounds where the first five 
rounds served as training on the baseline treatment.  The subsequent sixty rounds consisted of the 
five treatments.  This design created 7,200 individual-level observations (120 subjects x 60 
subjects) and 600 group-level observations (10 sessions x 60 rounds). 
All of the treatments had subjects have a set of induced values based on their ownership 
of one parcel of land.  The induced benefits represented the stream of benefits that would accrue 
to this seller type.  Transaction costs were considered part of the stream of benefits represented 
by the set of induced values and therefore were not treated separately.  Therefore, the decision in 
one round had no impact on their values or choices in subsequent round.  In other words, each 
round represented the beginning and the end of the world for this decision, which kept the data 
from each round independent (except, of course, for the learning that took place over time within 
individuals and in Part B where there was an auction that where the outcomes were affected 
slightly by group behavior).  The five treatments are summarized as follows: 
  3.1  Baseline 
  Buyers:    Set-Price Buyer (Developers) 
  Seller Choice:   i)    Accept set-price offer 
      ii)   Retain parcel, earn ownership return    
  In the Baseline treatment, subjects in each seller type were shown a set-price from a 
buyer, referred to as the ―Set-Price Buyer‖.  This set-price can be thought of as a posted price 
offered by a developer for the landowner to sell their land.  The administrator served as the set-
price buyer and the posted prices were pre-set to test the theory described above.  The seller has 
the choice of accepting this set-price or retraining their parcel of land and earning the induced 
ownership return.   
  After each subject had made their decision, the administrator computer would record this 
information and then provide subjects with their next set of induced values.  The subjects also 
learned of the number of parcel purchased by the Set-Price Buyer and the lowest, highest, and 
average prices paid.  This information was displayed on the subject‘s spreadsheet.  These 
procedures continued until all 12 rounds of this treatment were completed.   20 
  
  3.2  Public Auction  
  Buyers:    Set-Price Buyers & Auction Buyer (public conservation buyer) 
      Auction Rules: Discriminative auction  
  Seller Choice:   i)    Accept Set-Price offer 
      ii)   Try to sell to Auction buyer 
                a.   Sell & receive auction payment 
                b.   Don‘t sell, retain parcel 
      iii)   Retain parcel, earn ownership return  
In the Public Auction treatment, subjects again received a set of induced values for their parcel 
and received a posted price from the Set-Price Buyer.  As in the Baseline treatment, the subjects 
had the choice to accept the Set-Price offer or to retain their parcel.  However, in this treatment, 
the subject could also try to sell their parcel by submitting an offer to sell to the ―Auction 
Buyer‖.  The Auction Buyer could be though of as a government conservation agency.   
  Subjects were aware that the Auction Buyer had a budget of $8,535 to purchase as many 
parcels as possible.  Similar, to the auctions used government conservation agencies, such as the 
Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Foundation, a discriminative auction was used where 
the offers to sell were ranked from lowest to highest, based on offer price, and then the Auction 
buyer would buy the lowest priced-parcel and continue up the list of offers until the budget was 
exhausted.  Subjects that sold their parcels to the Auction buyer received their offer price and 
those that did not successfully sell to the Auction buyer just received their ownership return since 
they still retained the parcel.  Whatever funds remained in the budget for the Auction buyer after 
the round did not carry forward into the next round.  As described previously, each round was 
considered the beginning and end of the world. 
  After each subject had made their decision, the administrator computer would record this 
information and then inform the subjects who submitted their offers to the Auction Buyer   21 
whether they had successfully sold their unit.  After each round, subjects learned of the number 
of parcel purchased by the Set-Price Buyer and the lowest, highest, and average prices paid.  
They also learned the number of offers submitted to the Auction Buyer, the number of parcels 
purchase, and the lowest, highest, and average accepted offer purchased.  This information was 
displayed on the subject‘s spreadsheet.   
  3.3  Impact Fee 
  Buyers:    Set-Price Buyer  
  Public Rules:    Fee added to the point of sale 
  Seller Choice:   i)  Accept set-price offer and pay fee 
      ii) Retain parcel, earn ownership return   
  The Impact Fee (or flat tax) treatment operated identically to the Baseline treatment, 
except that now when a subject accepted the set-price they had to also pay the fee (similar to an 
impact fee in real estate settings).  As described above, the set-price was set equivalent to the 
social surplus lost from developing the parcel. 
  Like with the Baseline treatment, after each subject had made their decision, the 
administrator computer would record this information and then provide subjects with their next 
set of induced values.  The subjects also learned of the number of parcel purchased by the Set-
Price Buyer and the lowest, highest, and average prices paid.   
  3.4  Screening Mechanism I – Development Value Unknown 
  Buyers:    Set-Price Buyer & Contract Buyer 
  Public Rules:    Four different contracts with different effects on the Land Income 
and Personal Value  
  Seller Choice:   i)  Accept developer offer 
      ii) Accept one of four contracts 
      iii) Retain parcel, earn ownership return     22 
The Screen Mechanism I treatment built upon the Baseline treatment, except that the 
subjects also faced up to four different contracts that had various affects on their set of induced 
values as described above.  Therefore, the choices faced by subjects was to sell to the Set-Price 
Buyer (no impact fee was included in this treatment), retain their parcel and received the 
ownership return, or to accept the contract and the resulting payoff vector. 
  After each subject had made their decision, the administrator computer would record this 
information and then provide subjects with their next set of induced values.  The subjects also 
learned of the number of parcel purchased by the Set-Price Buyer and the lowest, highest, and 
average prices paid.  The screens also displayed the number of contracts that were accepted by 
subjects. 
  3.5  Screening Mechanism II – Development Value Known 
  Buyers:    Set-Price Buyer & Contract Buyer 
  Public Rules:    Four different contracts with different effects on the Land Income 
and Personal Value based on development value. 
  Seller Choice:   i)  Accept developer offer 
      ii) Accept one of four contracts 
      iii) Retain parcel, earn ownership return 
The Screen Mechanism II treatment operated identically to the Screen Mechanism I 
treatment, except that the contracts were now different based on the assumption that the 
government would be able to observe the development value of the parcels and therefore make 
more specific contracts to improve social efficiency. 
 
4  Results 
The driving hypothesis is that the discriminative conservation auction is unlikely to be 
cost effective because an information asymmetry introduces adverse selection.  The data from   23 
experiments testing this theory illustrate that this hypothesis is likely to be correct.    This can 
been seen by inspecting the five panels in figure 1 and the summary results shown in table 1. 
Figure 1(first panel) reflects treatment A.  When subjects were confronted only with a 
developer buyer, the data replicate what is known as a problem of overdevelopment.  The circle 
sizes reflect the number of participants accepting the developer‘s offer by type.  Many of the 
types that were vulnerable to the developer‘s offer (Types 1, 5, 6, 11, and 12, despite the social 
efficiency of their remaining in farming.  Yet, the subjects reflecting adverse selection do not 
tend to accept the developer‘s offer (Types 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8).  As can be seen in Table 2, 
treatment A results in the lowest average social surplus $16,366.  The subsequent analysis will 
used this treatment as the baseline to see how alternative mechanism compare to the situation 
where no government program exists to deal with the externality. 
The second panel shows treatment B, which replicates the current discriminative 
conservation auction.  Adverse selection is rampant, with subjects who would remain in farming 
without a program now winning the auction (and thus getting government payments despite their 
intention to remain in farming).  Moreover, many of the subjects vulnerable to the developer‘s 
offer still accept it.  Hence, the net effect of the program is not much different than a world 
without a program.  This provides experimental evidence for the adverse selection hypothesis.  
Relative to the baseline treatment A, social surplus does increase to $17,614 (Table 2), which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level (Table 3)  
The third panel shows treatment C, the tax program.  The results are stark.  Almost every 
subject made a decision in-line with social efficiency.  In this case, Type 9 subjects develop 
97.5% of the time compared to the other 11 subject types which developed only 1.4% of the time 
(Table 1).  This yielded the highest level of social surplus – an average of $19,623, which is 
statistically higher than the baseline at the 0.01 level (Table 3).  The surplus in this treatment is 
also statistically higher than any of the other treatments.   
The mechanisms in treatments D and E—panels four and five in figure 1—show that the 
contracts can successfully sort subjects by types.  The average social surplus in treatment D was 
$18,307 while in treatment E it was $18,881 (Table 2).  Both of these results are better than the 
baseline (Table 3).  Also, the ability to write better contracts by knowing the development value   24 
(D) helps the government write contracts that yield more surplus as the social surplus increase in 
treatment E compared to treatment D is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  However, even 
the best contact mechanism fails to produce the socially optimal results of the tax program.  
Moreover, the treatments involve government expenditures and private penalties. 
Figure 2, considers the impact of these programs at varying level of government waste, 
w.  The horizontal axis extends from w=0 (no government waste) to w=1, such that an 
intermediate value, such as w=0.2 implies that $1.20 needs to be raised via taxes to deliver $1.00 
in government expenditure.  Inspection of this figure shows that the baseline treatment A is 
invariant with changes to w as no program exists.  However, increases in government waste 
decrease the social surplus of the auction (treatment B) and the conservation contracts 
(treatments D & E).  This figure also illustrates the superiority of the impact fee (treatment C), as 
like treatment A, the social surplus derived from this treatment is not related directly to 
government waste.   
Interestingly, if the concept of the ‗double-dividend‘ is applied to this case of government 
expenditures and associated taxes, we can see that the efficiency of impact fee (treatment C) 
actually delivers increasingly higher levels of social surplus with increases in w.  In contrast, the 
contracts where the values of D is unknown yields increasingly lower levels of social surplus 
with increases in w. 
In sum, the results show that adverse selection is likely to exist in conservation auctions 
and that a mechanism can sort types so as to improve cost effectiveness with respect to the 
specific information asymmetry.  However, the mechanisms involve large transfers and the 
experiments show that a simple externality-correcting tax can achieve more cost effectiveness 
with lower transfers.  This is an important result for policy because recent trends are focused on 
expanding fiscally costly auctions rather than taxes.  The result also is surprising and important 
for researchers because there is little intuition as to why the tax resolves the selection problem. 
 
5  Conclusions   25 
This  research  demonstrates  both  theoretically  and  empirical ly—using  experimental 
economics  techniques—that  conservation  auctions  are  plagued  by  adverse  selection  and,  in 
consequence, are not positively altering land-use patterns very much despite spending billions of 
dollars.  In other words, these policies are transferring billions of dollars from the government 
and nonprofits to landowners who were the most likely to deliver the conservation services in the 
absence of a policy.  Among the drivers of this problem are the auction mechanisms used, which 
allow landowners to ―name their price‖ and force program managers to select the ―cheapest,‖ 
and the relatively small program budgets, which ensure that only a small subset of potential 
sellers will be selected.  Although this story is straightforward, it has made little impact on the 
economic literature and there is no appreciable recognition of adverse selection in policy. 
A model of conservation auctions is developed to describe the adverse selection 
phenomenon.  The model then develops several versions of a mechanism to mitigate the 
incentive problem optimally.  Economic experiments test the contract mechanism relative to the 
commonly used discriminative auction and the status quo of no intervention.  Experiments 
involving 120 student subjects conducted in 2009 closely follow the theoretical predictions by 
testing five different treatments (See figure 1).  Of particular interest is the finding that 
conservation auctions are highly influenced by adverse selection.  In contrast, various 
conservation contracts can correctly sort the landowner types to achieve a higher level of 
efficiency, all of these policies involve government expenditures and are inferior to the 
implementation of an impact fee on development, which not only solves the externality problem 
underlying this question, but also solves the adverse selection problem as well. These results thus 
suggest changes to conservation markets, which will improve their cost-effectiveness. 
     26 
Works Cited 
Akerlof, George. 1970. The market for ―lemons‖: Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3)488-500. 
R. Aldrich, J. Wyerman, “2005 National Land Trust Census Report.”  (Land Trust Alliance, 
Washington, D.C. 2006). 
American Farmland Trust. March 2010. Status of State PACE Programs, at www.farmland.org 
(accessed March 17, 2010). 
Cason, T.N., and L. Gangadharan ―Auction De- sign for Voluntary Conservation Programs.‖ 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(2004):1211–17. 
Claassen R., Conservation Policy Briefing Room, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture. <http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/conservationpolicy/background.htm> 
accessed Feb. 2010. 
Duke, Joshua M. and Lori Lynch. 2006. Four classes of farmland retention techniques: 
Comparative evaluation and property rights implications. Land Economics 82(2):189-213 
European Union Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, “Rural 
Development in the European Union: Statistical and Economic Information Report 
2009.” (EU, Brussels, 2009). 
Horowitz, John K., Lori Lynch, and Andrew Stocking. 2009. Competition-based environmental 
policy: An analysis of farmland preservation in Maryland. Land Economics 85(4):555-
75. 
Kirwan, Barrett, Ruben Lubowski, and Michael J. Roberts. 2005. How Cost Effective are Land 
Retirement Auctions? Estimating the Difference between Payments and Willingness to 
Accept in the Conservation Reserve Program American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 2005, 87(5). 
C. Langpap, J. Kerkvliet, Allocating conservation resources under the Endangered Species Act.  
Am. J. Agric. Econ.  92, 110 (2010).   27 
Riley, John G. 2001. Silver signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling. Journal of 
Economic Literature 39:432-478. 
Schilizzi, Steven and Uwe Latacz-Lohmann. 2007. Assessing the performance of conservation 
auctions: An experimental study. Land Economics 83(4):497-515.  
Smith, Rodney B.W. 1995. The Conservation Reserve Program as a least-cost land retirement 
mechanism. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77:93-105. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Oct 7, 2009. Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Announces $1.7 
Billion in Conservation Reserve Program Rental Payments. USDA Newsroom, at 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject=landing&topic=n
er&newstype=newsrel&type=detail&item=nr_20091007_rel_0497.html (accessed 
January 30, 2010). 
Wu, JunJie and Bruce Babcock. 1996. Contract design for the purchase of environmental goods 
from agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:935-45. 
  
Table 1.  Individual choices by treatment. 
 
 
Type Sigma V (100s) Set Price Preserved Retained Set Price Preserved Retained Set Price Preserved Retained
9 0.75 0 97.5% 0.0% 2.5% 97.5% 0.8% 1.7% 97.5% 0.0% 2.5%
10 0.75 1 99.2% 0.0% 0.8% 93.3% 1.7% 5.0% 2.5% 0.0% 97.5%
11 0.75 2 99.2% 0.0% 0.8% 93.3% 3.3% 3.4% 2.5% 0.0% 97.5%
12 0.75 3 98.3% 0.0% 1.7% 42.5% 43.3% 14.2% 2.5% 0.0% 97.5%
5 0.5 0 96.7% 0.0% 3.3% 95.0% 3.3% 1.7% 2.5% 0.0% 97.5%
6 0.5 1 96.7% 0.0% 3.3% 17.5% 72.5% 10.0% 0.8% 0.0% 99.2%
7 0.5 2 1.7% 0.0% 98.3% 0.0% 78.3% 21.7% 0.8% 0.0% 99.2%
8 0.5 3 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 82.5% 17.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 0.25 0 96.7% 0.0% 3.3% 79.2% 10.0% 10.8% 3.3% 0.0% 96.7%
2 0.25 1 1.7% 0.0% 98.3% 0.8% 81.7% 17.5% 0.8% 0.0% 99.2%
3 0.25 2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
4 0.25 3 0.8% 0.0% 99.2% 0.0% 77.5% 22.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Type Sigma V (100s) Set Price Preserved Contract1 Contract2 Contract3 Retained Set Price Preserved Contract4 Contract5 Retained
9 0.75 0 97.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 98.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
10 0.75 1 95.8% 4.2% 0.8% 2.5% 0.8% 0.0% 98.3% 1.7% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0%
11 0.75 2 92.5% 7.5% 0.8% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 93.3% 93.3% 0.0% 0.8%
12 0.75 3 7.5% 91.7% 0.0% 1.7% 90.0% 0.8% 0.8% 99.2% 99.2% 0.0% 0.0%
5 0.5 0 97.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 97.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0%
6 0.5 1 6.7% 92.5% 0.0% 91.7% 0.8% 0.8% 5.0% 92.5% 91.7% 0.8% 2.5%
7 0.5 2 0.8% 95.0% 0.0% 92.5% 2.5% 4.2% 0.8% 95.0% 92.5% 2.5% 3.3%
8 0.5 3 0.8% 98.3% 1.7% 0.8% 95.8% 0.8% 0.8% 90.0% 5.8% 84.2% 1.7%
1 0.25 0 8.3% 90.8% 90.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 1.7% 98.3% 98.3% 0.0% 0.0%
2 0.25 1 0.8% 95.8% 0.8% 95.0% 0.0% 3.3% 0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 0.0% 97.5%
3 0.25 2 0.0% 96.7% 0.8% 95.0% 0.8% 3.3% 0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 0.0% 97.5%
4 0.25 3 0.0% 99.2% 0.8% 4.2% 94.2% 0.8% 0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 0.0% 97.5%
Treatment D (Contracts - D Unknown) Treatment E (Contracts - D Unknown)
Treatment B (Auction) Treatment C (Impact Fee) Treatment A (Baseline)  29 






   
 
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average
A Baseline 5,267 $      19,086 $    21,944 $    23,796 $    10,100 $    10,311 $    21,745 $    23,954 $    14,950 $    15,036 $    15,058 $    15,149 $    16,366 $   
B Auction 6,667 $      19,205 $    21,944 $    23,954 $    10,150 $    17,693 $    21,944 $    23,954 $    14,950 $    15,288 $    15,463 $    20,149 $    17,614 $   
C Impact Fee 12,733 $    19,205 $    21,944 $    23,954 $    12,925 $    19,247 $    21,845 $    23,954 $    14,950 $    19,216 $    21,771 $    23,731 $    19,623 $   
D Contracts (D unknown) 12,333 $    19,179 $    21,905 $    23,613 $    10,075 $    18,701 $    21,838 $    23,448 $    14,950 $    15,152 $    15,484 $    23,002 $    18,307 $   
E Contracts (D known) 12,867 $    19,152 $    21,729 $    23,705 $    10,075 $    18,484 $    21,310 $    23,797 $    14,967 $    15,072 $    21,539 $    23,880 $    18,881 $   
Average 9,973 $      19,166 $    21,893 $    23,805 $    10,665 $    16,887 $    21,737 $    23,822 $    14,953 $    15,953 $    17,863 $    21,182 $    18,158 $   Table 3.  Panel Data Analysis of Social Surplus 
 
   Coefficient  P-value 
Constant  13,161.53  0.000 
Treat_B  1,247.11  0.000 
Treat_C  3,256.59  0.000 
Treat_D  1,940.34  0.000 
Treat_E  2,515.00  0.000 
Type_1  -4,980.00  0.000 
Type_2  4,212.17  0.000 
Type_3  6,939.91  0.000 
Type_4  8,851.33  0.000 
Type_5  -4,288.33  0.000 
Type_6  1,933.82  0.000 
Type_7  6,783.26  0.000 
Type_8  8,868.35  0.000 
Type_10  999.71  0.000 
Type_11  2,909.51  0.000 
Type_12  6,228.83  0.000 
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Figure 2:  Social Surplus at Different Levels of Government Waste   33 
 
Appendix: Experiment Instructions  
Instructions -- Set-Price Buyer 
Welcome  to  this  experiment  in  the  economics  of  decision  making.    During  the  experiment,  you  will  have 
opportunities  to  earn  money.    Any  money  earned  is  yours  to  keep.    Therefore,  please  read  these  instructions 
carefully.  Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
In this experiment, you will assume the role of an owner of one parcel of land, and you will make decisions about 
whether or not to sell your parcel.  You will make one decision per round.  The session administrator will assume 
the role of a Set-Price Buyer and all buying decisions will be made according the rules described here. 
Below is a hypothetical example of a computer screen you might see in the experiment—all numbers displayed are 
hypothetical and in no way correspond to numbers you will see in the actual experiment.  In this example, three 
rounds have been completed and the fourth round is about to begin.  Your parcel is assigned a Land Ownership 
Return, which is derived from two components: Land Income and Personal Value. 
  Land Income indicates the monetary value to you of growing products on your parcel or from renting your 
parcel to another party.   
  Personal Value is a monetary measure of any additional enjoyment you receive from owning or managing 
this parcel of land. 
  Land Ownership Return equals Land Income and Personal Value added together.  This is the total 
amount of money you earn if you do not sell your parcel. 
 
In the example above, the Land Ownership Return is $200 in the first round, $200 in the second round and $200 in 
the third round.  Your ownership return will not necessarily be the same as that of other sellers and will change 
throughout the experiment.  Decisions made in any given round will not affect your values in subsequent rounds 
(though your total cash earnings from the experiment will be cumulative).    34 
In each round, the buyer will offer a Set Price to purchase your parcel and you must decide if you want to accept it 









Payoffs in Each Round 
After everyone has submitted their confidential choice, the administrator records which sellers sold their parcels and 
then pays each player.  There are two possible payoff scenarios: 
i)  Sellers who accept the Set-Price Buyer‘s price will receive the Set Price.  For example in Round 1, the 
seller would have earned $400. 
ii)  Sellers who do not accept the Set-Price Buyer‘s price will receive their ownership return for the parcel.  For 
example in Round 2, the seller earned a profit of $600.    
Market Information  
As seen at the bottom of the sample screen, after each round you will receive market information, summarizing the 
choices of other people in this experiment session.  This information will be revealed on your spreadsheet when you 
click on the ―Retrieve‖ button upon the instruction of the administrator.   The market information includes the number of 
subjects selling for the Set Price.  It also includes the lowest, highest, and average Set Prices accepted. 
Final Earnings 
Your computer will calculate your payoffs in each round and will keep track of your cumulative earnings.  An 
exchange rate of 37,500 to 1 will be used to convert your earnings from experimental dollars to US dollars.  For 
example, if you earn 750,000 experimental dollars will have earned $20 US to take home today. 
Set Price 
To accept the Set 
Price, select “yes” from 
pull-down list in the 





To reject the Set Price, 
keep the “no” in the 
yellow box.  Click 
“submit”. 
Your payoff 
is the Set 
Price. 
Your payoff 
is the Land 
Ownership 
Return.   35 
B 
Instructions -- Set-Price Buyer and Auction Buyer 
This part is similar to the first part of the experiment, except that you have an additional choice to consider.  In each 
round, the Set-Price Buyer will again offer a Set Price to purchase your parcel and you must decide whether you 
want to: (1) accept it; (2) reject it; or (3) reject it and participate in an auction.  You now may also try to sell your 
land parcel to an Auction Buyer who makes decisions based on an auction.  An example of the computer screen is 
below: 
In each round, the Set-Price Buyer will again offer a Set Price to purchase your parcel and you must decide whether 














The Set Price may change in each round.  The auction buyer‘s anticipated budget will be $8,535 in each round, 
though the amount actually spent will be determined by the number of sellers who participate in the auction. 
How the Auction Works 
To sell in the auction, keep 
the “no” in the yellow box 
and type in your Offer into 
the orange box. Click 
“submit”. 
Your payoff is your 
Offer plus Land 
Ownership Return, if 
accepted, or the Land 
Ownership Return, if 
rejected. 
To accept the Set Price, 
select “yes” from pull-
down list in the yellow box 
and keep the orange box 
blank.  Click “submit”.   
Your Choice 
To reject the Set Price, 
keep the “no” in the 
yellow box and the orange 
box blank.  Click “submit”. 
 
Your payoff is 
the Set Price. 




Set Price   36 
After everyone has submitted their confidential decision, the administrator will rank all the offers received for the 
auction from lowest to highest and then determine which participants sold their parcels based on the budget for that 
round.  For this example, the auction buyer‘s budget will be $3,000.  The auction buyer will purchase as many parcels 
as possible starting from the lowest offer price and moving up until the available budget is exhausted.  For example, 
imagine a round in which seven offers were submitted (ranked from lowest to highest): 
Parcel #  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Offers:  $400  $400  $500  $600  $600  $700  $800  $900 
 
Parcels are purchased in order (from left to right) until the auction buyer does not have enough money to purchase 
another parcel.  In the example, the five lowest offer prices ($400 + $400 + $500 + $600 + $600) are purchased for a 
total of $2,500.  None of the last three offers are purchased, since even the lowest non-accepted bid of $700 would bring 
the total cost to $3,200 ($2,500 + $700) and therefore be higher than the buyer‘s budget of $3,000. 
In the below example, the seller submitted an Auction Offer of $500 for Round 1 and $800 for Round 2.  When the 
offer of $500 was accepted in the auction, the seller received $500 plus the Land Ownership Return of $300, thus 
yielding a payoff of $800.  In Round 2, when the offer was not accepted in the auction, the earnings were just the 
land ownership return of $600.  In Round 3, no offer was submitted as the seller accepted the set price of $300.  In 
round 4, no offer was submitted nor was the set price accepted, which means the seller receives the Land Ownership 
Return of $500.  
     37 
 
Payoffs in Each Round 
After all subjects make their decisions, the administrator will conduct the auction to determine which parcels were 
purchased.  You will then click on the ―Retrieve‖ button.  If you submitted an Offer, you will learn whether you sold 
your parcel.  There are four possible payoff scenarios: 
i)  Sellers who accept the Set-Price Buyer‘s price (and thus do not submit to the auction) will receive the Set 
Price.  For example in Round 3, the seller would have earned $300. 
ii)  Sellers who do not accept the Set-Price Buyer‘s price nor submit an offer in the auction will receive their 
ownership return for the parcel.  For example in Round 4, the seller earned a profit of $500.    
iii)  Successful sellers in the auction receive a payoff equal to their offer plus their Land Ownership Return.  In 
Round 1 in the example above, the subject earned $500 by successfully selling his parcel for an offer of 
$500. 
iv)  Subjects that submit an offer that is too high for the available budget will not receive their offer, but instead 
their payoff will be their Land Ownership Return.  For example in Round 2, the subject earned $600 even 
though she did not sell her parcel.  
 
Market Information  
In addition to the Set-Price market information shown in the first part of the experiment, you will also receive market 
information about the auction.  The auction market information includes the number of subjects submitting offers and 
the number of offers accepted.  It also includes the lowest and highest offers accepted and the average offers accepted.   38 
C 
Instructions -- Set-Price Buyer with Sales Fee 
This part is almost identical to the first part of the experiment.  The only change is that if you accept the Set Price, 
then you have to pay a Sales Fee.  An example of the computer screen is: 
 







Your payoffs in each round will be determined almost exactly as in the first part of the experiment.  The only 




To accept the Set Price, 
select “yes” from pull-
down list in the yellow 




To reject the Set Price, 
keep the “no” in the 








is the Land 
Ownership 
Return.   39 
D/F 
Instructions -- Set-Price Buyer and Contract Buyer 
This part of the experiment is similar to the first part, except that you have additional choices to consider.  You now 
may also try to sell it to a Contract Buyer who offers a series of possible contracts, from which you can select one 
or none.  See sample computer screen: 
 
In each round, the Set-Price Buyer will offer a Set Price to purchase your parcel and the Contract Buyer will offer a 
set of contracts for you to consider.  You must decide whether to: (1) accept the Set Price; (2) to accept one of the 
contracts  and,  if  so,  which  one;  or  (3)  reject  all  contracts  and  the  Set  Price,  thus  keeping  your  original  Land 
Ownership Return.  You cannot accept the Set Price and a Contract.  
 












Payoffs in Each Round 
After everyone has submitted their confidential choice, the administrator records which sellers sold their parcels or 
accepted contracts, and then pays each player.  There are three possible payoff scenarios: 
i)  Sellers who accept the Set-Price Buyer‘s price will receive the Set Price.  For example in Round 1, the 
seller would have earned $900. 
ii)  Sellers may accept a contract if they do not accept the Set-Price.  If a contract is selected, then a new Land 
Ownership Return is calculated for the payoff.  For example in Round 2, the seller accepted the second 
contract and earned a new Land Ownership Return of $810. 
iii)  Sellers  may  reject  the  Set  Price  and  reject  all  the  contracts.    These  sellers  receive  the  original  Land 
Ownership Return.  For example, in Round 3 the seller rejects the Set Price and all the contracts.  This 
seller‘s payoff is the original Land Ownership Return of $600. 
 
Market Information  
The market information is the same as in the first part of the experiment.  Now, however, the screen also displays the 
total number of contracts accepted by subjects in the experiment. 
 
 
To reject all contracts and 
the Set Price, keep the “no” 
in the yellow box and all the 
orange boxes.  Click 
“submit”. 
Your payoff is 
your original Land 
Ownership 
Return. 
To accept the Set Price, 
select “yes” from pull-
down list in the yellow 




Choice  To accept a contract, 
select “yes” from the 
pull-down list in one of 
the orange boxes. Click  
submit” 
Your payoff 
is the Set 
Price. 
Your payoff is the new 
Land Ownership 
Return for the selected 
contract. 
Set Price 